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Nature of the Case 
The of Idaho appeals from the district court's Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. State alleges that the district court when it granted 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Dona Nichoeal Westlake maintains that the State has 
failed to show any error in the district court's ruling that Ms. Gallagher did not have 
apparent authority to consent to the search of Westlake's backpack. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Westlake was visiting her friend, Katherine Ms. Gallagher's 
motel room. Two other people, Reymundo and Scott Parker, were also in the 
room. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-7.) Police officers responded to the motel because they received 
an anonymous tip that a wanted person, Reymundo Chavez, was at the motel. 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.7-18.) Detective Williamson and four other officers knocked on the door 
and asked if Mr. Chavez was there. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-14, p.9, Ls.5-6.) Ms. Gallagher 
said that he was and gave them permission to come in. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-14, p.9, Ls.6-
22.) Ms. Gallagher also confirmed that she was the one who had rented the room. 
(Tr., p.41, Ls.13-21.) Detective Williamson ordered Ms. Westlake, Ms. Gallagher, and 
Mr. Parker to leave the room. (Tr., p.16-21.) They were placed on a bench outside, 
and one of the officers stood with them. (Tr., p.12, L.18- p.13, Ls.3.) 
The officers arrested Mr. Chavez and waited inside the motel room with him until 
a unit could arrive to transport him. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-10, p.13, Ls.7-9.) While they were 
waiting, Detective Cwik told Detective Williamson that he saw a bong in an open drawer 
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in one of the dressers. (Tr., p.13, Ls.15-17.) Detective Williamson brought 
Ms. Gallagher back into the motel room, and Ms. Gallagher gave Detective Williamson 
consent to search the room. (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-16, p.15, Ls.1-11.) Detective Williamson 
also asked Ms. Gallagher if she wanted to be a confidential informant. (Tr., p.36, Ls.18-
23.) Prior to searching a purse on the bed, the officers asked Ms. Gallagher if the purse 
belonged to her and she said that it did. (Tr., p.71, Ls.20-24, p.77, Ls.21-25.) 
Without asking to whom it belonged, Detective Cwik then searched a small pink 
backpack that was located on the bed in the common area of the room, and he found 
what appeared to be methamphetamine. (Tr., p.15, Ls.18-24, p.17, Ls.18-22.) 
Detective Williamson asked Ms. Gallagher if the backpack was hers, and she said the 
backpack belonged to Ms. Westlake. (Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.2.) Ms. Westlake 
admitted thatthe backpack belonged to her, and she was arrested. (Tr., p.17, Ls.18-19, 
p.32, Ls.5-6.) 
Ms. Westlake filed a Motion to Suppress and a hearing was held. (R., pp.60-70, 
83.) Ms. Westlake argued that she was unlawfully detained, and that Ms. Gallagher's 
consent was not sufficient to allow police to search her backpack. (R., pp.60-70.) The 
district court granted the Motion to Suppress and ruled that Ms. Gallagher did not have 
apparent authority to consent to the search Ms. Westlake's pink backpack because 
there were two female occupants in the room, it was unclear who the owner of the 
backpack was, the officers had seen Ms. Gallagher enter the hotel room without the 
backpack, the backpack was located on the bed where Ms. Westlake had been sitting, 
and the officers could have easily asked Ms. Gallagher if the backpack was hers. 
(Tr., p.118, Ls.8-23, p.120, Ls.5-16.) The State timely appealed. (R., p.98.) 
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ISSUE 
The State states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by concluding that officers did not have apparent 
authority to search the pink backpack and had to get specific consent to search 
the pink backpack? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Because the State's characterization of the issue on appeal 
misstates the apparent authority doctrine, Ms. Westlake rephrases the issue as: 
Has the State failed to show any error in the district court's decision that 
Ms. Gallagher did not have apparent authority to consent to the search of 
Ms. Westlake's backpack? 
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ARGUMENT 
The State Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Decision That 
Ms. Gallagher Did Not Have Apparent Authority To Consent To The Search Of 
Ms. Westlake's Backpack 
A. Introduction 
The district court 
consent to the search of 
Ms. Gallagher did not have apparent authority to 
Westlake's backpack. The State has failed to show any 
error in the court's decision and, therefore, the district court's order suppressing 
evidence should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. Court of Appeals 
articulated the following of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At 
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. 
Id. at 302 (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Correctly Decided That Ms. Gallagher Did Not Have Apparent 
Authority To Consent To The Search Of Ms. Westlake's Backpack 
When a search is based on consent, it is not enough that the State prove 
consent, the State must also prove that that consent is valid. See State v. Mccaughey, 
127 Idaho 669, 672-73 (1995). A warrant is not required when police obtain consent for 
the search from a person who has actual authority to consent. State v. Johnson, 110 
Idaho 516, 522 (1986). Actual authority can result from common authority over the 
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premises, resulting from "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint 
access or control for most purposes," as in the case of married couples or joint tenants. 
Id. Here, Ms. Gallagher clearly did not have actual authority to consent to the search of 
Ms. Westlake's backpack because it did not belong to her and she was not mutually 
using it. Therefore, the State attempts to justify the search of the backpack based on 
the doctrine of apparent authority. When the State seeks to validate a warrantless 
search of a citizen's residence based upon apparent authority, the State carries the 
burden of proving that at the time of the consent, the state officials had an objectively 
reasonable belief that the consenter had the authority to authorize the search. Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); see also Mccaughey, supra, 127 Idaho at 672-73. In 
Mccaughey, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
[W]hat we hold today does not suggest that law enforcement officers may 
always accept a person's invitation to enter premises. Even when the 
invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives 
there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a 
reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further 
inquiry. 
Id. (citing Rodriguez at 188). The Idaho Supreme Court then recognized: 
[T]he determination of consent to enter in the search and seizure context 
must be judged against an objective standard, i.e., whether the facts 
available to the officer at the moment would warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority 
over the premises. Thus, the Court held that if the answer was in the 
negative, then a warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless 
actual authority exists. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, the State argues that the search of Ms. Westlake's backpack was 
reasonable because of the consent given by Ms. Gallagher to search her motel room. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Although it was reasonable for officers to conclude that 
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Ms. Gallagher had actual authority to consent to the search of the room itself, including 
items in the closets, bathroom, and drawers, it was unreasonable for the officers to 
believe, given the fact that there were rnultiple occupants in the room who were still 
present at the scene, that Ms. Gallagher had the authority to consent to the search of 
every purse, bag, or backpack in the room. As such, the warrantless search violated 
Ms. Westlake's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The State misstates the district court's ruling when it says that the district court 
"held that the officers were required to ask for consent to search each container in the 
room." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The district court never ruled that the officers were 
required to ask for consent to search each container in the room, but rather that a duty 
of reasonable inquiry required that the officers take additional steps when the totality of 
the circumstances suggested that the consenting party was not able to consent to the 
search of a particular item, i.e. the backpack. (Tr., p.115, L.19 - p.117, L.18.) 
The State further claims that "there was nothing about the location or appearance 
of the pink backpack that would indicate that it was owned, possessed and controlled 
exclusively by Westlake." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) This statement is contrary to the 
facts found by the district court. The backpack in question appeared to belong to a 
female and, because there were two female occupants in the room, it was unclear to 
whom the backpack belonged. (Tr., p.30, Ls.8-13.) The officers had seen 
Ms. Gallagher enter the hotel room without the backpack, and the backpack was 
located on the bed where Ms. Westlake had been sitting. (Tr., p.118, Ls.8-23.) The 
police could have asked Ms. Gallagher, who was standing in the room, or Ms. Westlake, 
who was outside, to whom the backpack belonged. (Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, Ls.3, p.14, 
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Ls.12-16.) Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court ruled that 
Ms. Gallagher's broad consent to search the motel room was insufficient as to the 
backpack and the officers had a duty to inquire about who owned it. (Tr., p.117, Ls.12-
18, p.118, Ls.8-23, p.120, Ls.5-16.) 
The State's reliance on State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728 (2002), in support of its 
argument that Ms. Gallagher had apparent authority to consent to the search of 
Ms. Westlake's backpack is also unpersuasive because the facts here are 
distinguishable. In Barker, Ms. Barker and Mr. Tate were living together in an 
apartment, and Ms. Barker conceded that Mr. Tate possessed common authority over 
the apartment such that he could consent to a search. Id. at 731. The issue in Barker 
was whether or not Mr. Tate's waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of 
his parole authorized a search of their joint apartment. Id. The specific item at issue 
was a fanny pack in the apartment that Ms. Barker claimed belonged to her. Id. The 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
The authority to consent to a search is not derived from the law of property 
(e.g., ownership), but is based upon common authority over the property 
to be searched" and "that common authority rests upon the mutual use of 
the property by persons generally having joint access or control over it for 
most purposes." 
Id. (citations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that because Mrs. Barker 
and Mr. Tate lived together and the fanny pack was located in a bedroom where both 
Ms. Barker and Mr. Tate slept, and there were no facts to indicate that the fanny pack 
was owned exclusively by Ms. Barker or that she had exclusive control over it, it was 
proper for the police to search it based on Mr. Tate's waiver. Id. at 732. 
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The facts here are very different. The State presented no evidence to support 
the idea that Ms. Gallagher and Ms. Westlake had a joint interest in anything that was in 
the motel room. Unlike in Barker, where the police concluded that the fanny pack could 
have belonged to both Ms. Barker and Mr. Tate, since they lived together, the backpack 
here obviously belonged to either Ms. Gallagher or Ms. Westlake. The district court 
correctly determined that the officers could not reasonably assume, without further 
inquiry, that the backpack belonged to Ms. Gallagher. 
Further, the State argues on appeal that "the district court repeatedly found that 
Detective Cwik reasonably believed that Gallagher had authority to consent to search of 
items in the room." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) The State goes on to cite five specific 
quotes by the district court where the court discussed how it did not fault the officers 
and that their conduct was understandable. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) This 
commentary by the district court is not relevant to its ultimate ruling. Clearly, the district 
court found that the officers' actions were unreasonable and violated Ms. Westlake's 
Fourth Amendment rights because it granted Ms. Westlake's Motion to Suppress. The 
district court's explanation that it did not fault the officers for making a mistake simply 
reinforced its statement that it found Detective Cwik's testimony credible when Detective 
Cwik said he thought the backpack belonged to Ms. Gallagher. (Tr., p.117, Ls.8-11.) 
The district court may have found that the officers subjectively believed they were not 
doing anything wrong and that their mistake was "understandable," but it ultimately 
determined that their actions were not objectively reasonable. 
Finally, the State cites the fact that Ms. Westlake did not object to the search as 
a basis for the reasonableness of the officer's belief that the backpack belonged to 
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Ms. Gallagher. (Appeilant's Brief, p.16-18.) Given the facts of this case, this argument 
has no merit. Ms. Westlake did not have an opportunity to object to the search because 
she did not know the search was happening. She was ordered out of the room and was 
placed on a bench by another officer and an FBI agent. (Tr., p.11, Ls.16-21, p.12, 18-
21, p.13, Ls.2-3, p.27, Ls.1-9.) After Detective Cwik saw the bong, Ms. Gallagl1er was 
brought back inside the motel room and Detective Williamson asked for her consent to 
search the room. (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-22.) Detective Williamson also asked Ms. Gallagher if 
she wanted to be an informant for the police. (Tr., p.36, Ls.18-23.) The State claims 
that Ms. Westlake was "only two to three feet away from the front door," but there are no 
facts to support the assumption that Ms. Westlake heard the conversation or was 
permitted to object to the search. To the contrary, the fact that Detective Williamson 
was speaking with Ms. Gallagher about whether she wanted to be a confidential 
informant supports the conclusion that this was a private conversation. Therefore, the 
State's line of cases regarding the failure of a person with a possessory interest in an 
item to object to a search of that item is not supported by the facts here and should not 
be considered. 
D. All Evidence Collected Following The Officers' Illegal Search Of Ms. Westlake's 
Backpack Was Correctly Suppressed As Fruit Of Illegal Governmental Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is 
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
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sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, supra, 371 
U.S. at 488. Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would 
not have come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. 
Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). 
As discussed above, the illegal search of Ms. Westlake's backpack led directly to 
the discovery of the alleged methamphetamine. The State failed to meet its burden of 
showing that the evidence is untainted; therefore, the district court correctly held that all 
the evidence collected and statements obtained after the impermissible search and 
seizure should be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Westlake respectfully requests that this court affirm the district court's order 
granting her Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2015. 
KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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